

Deterrence Summary and Sources

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Disclaimer. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This note is a work-in-progress prepared by Dennis Egan, Paul Kantor and Fred Roberts of CCICADA at Rutgers University. These are contemporaneous working notes prepared to improve communication with the project’s Champion.

Analyses of Deterrence

Bryan Roberts’ (2015) analysis of deterrence lists four key factors that affect a potential migrant’s decision to attempt to enter the U.S. illegally. The factors are:

- The probability of successful entry, including the number of attempts the migrant expects to have to make
- Costs
- The consequences of an unsuccessful attempt, i.e. what happens if apprehended
- The expected benefits of being successful

The U.S. government has tried to deter additional illegal migration through various policies and enforcement processes aimed at each of the four factors. First, it has tried to reduce the probability of successful illegal entry by adding additional CBP officers, constructing miles of fencing, using sensors and drones, etc. In fact, the probability of apprehension between ports of entry on the Southwest border appears to have risen somewhat from approximately the range around 30% to the range around 50%. By some analyses this increase has also had a deterrent effect, i.e. fewer migrants, Mexicans specifically, try to cross the border illegally now than were doing so previously. Second, a by-product of better enforcement has been that the costs of attempting illegal entry have risen. Virtually everyone attempting to cross the border illegally now pays guides or coyotes for assistance. The rates charged by coyotes also have risen. There is increased physical danger due to shifts in crossing locations to remote areas to avoid detection. Third, the U.S. government has developed the Consequence Delivery System (see following paragraphs) in an attempt to increase in various ways the hardship of being apprehended. Finally, the government is pursuing programs in the interior of the country by ICE to deport more undocumented migrants who have managed to cross the border and settle in the U.S. These actions should have the effect of reducing the benefits of successfully crossing the border illegally.

Deterrence and the Consequence Delivery System.

Starting in FY 2011, the U.S. Border Patrol began implementing a program called the Consequence Delivery System (CDS). Prior to that time, it was commonly the case that a Mexican crossing the border illegally would be allowed to return back across the border

voluntarily (“voluntary return”) after being interviewed and finger printed, with no further consequences. The CDS provides more severe consequences. These range from being returned across the border at a different location (“lateral repatriation” making it harder for the migrant to reconnect with the coyote or smuggling network used for assistance) to court procedures (“expedited removal”) and in some cases criminal prosecution and detention in jail (via a group process called “Streamline”).

Capps, Hipsman, and Meissner (2017) of the Migration Policy Institute studied the effectiveness and the efficiency of CDS using Border Patrol data from FY 2011 through FY 2014. They found some evidence that CDS has worked to reduce recidivism, namely that the more severe forms of CDS (various forms of formal removal and court proceedings) led to lower recidivism rates compared to voluntary return. For example the overall percentage of migrants who were apprehended more than once in a fiscal year declined from 29% in 2007 to 14% in 2014. As promising as this result appears, the analyses supporting policy have been made difficult by the way that the Border Patrol collects and reports recidivism data. Also, administrative issues in deploying some of the consequences, e.g. logistics involving the staff of different government agencies, has meant that some consequences cannot be realistically applied in all sectors. Changes in the demographics of migrants crossing the Southwest border (from mostly Mexicans to a majority of women and children fleeing violence in Central America) further constrains the kinds of consequences that can be delivered by the Border Patrol.

A table summarizing the sources we have found concerning deterrence issues follows.

Note: many authors use deterrence loosely, and, for example, consider that increased apprehensions represents a kind of deterrence. Careful reading of each resource often resolves the ambiguity. We use “deter” to include all who “would have crossed but do not try.” This is larger than the set who approach the border and are dissuaded by what they see, what they hear, or the current market price of a coyote. It is smaller than the set including people who would seek to cross the border if the conditions in their home regions were worse than they are. Even with the specifications given here, it is hard to know which factors are in play for a given individual. Econometric analysis can only see the averages. Individual interviews are far more accurate. The specific need, of the present study, is to be able to estimate how many of the “tagged” (that is, biometrically identified) individuals will attempt to cross the border again, *within specific time periods*. As noted elsewhere, binning the apprehensions by the Fiscal Year of apprehension makes the data almost worthless for this analysis.

Selected Annotated Items

ITEM	Measuring Illegal Border Crossing Between Ports of Entry: An Assessment of Four Promising Methods RAND_OP328.pdf
DATE	2006
AUTHOR(S)	Andrew R. Morral, Henry H. Willis, Peter Brownell. RAND

	· Contract: W74V8H-06-C-0002;
FINDING	4 promising methods.
METHOD	Literature Review
DEMOGRAPHIC	NA
ANNOTATION	This is a very important paper, and describes four indirect methods. Each has been applied or improved since 2005. We have prepared a detailed summary, particularly in relation to the fact that deterrence (surely) and apprehension rate (possibly) will depend on demographics, origin, and “consequences.”
annotator	paul

ITEM	https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/WOLA-Summary_Mexicos-Southern-Border-2017-1.pdf
DATE	June 2017
AUTHOR(S)	Anon.
FINDING	Assess Trump drop will not last. More Guatemalans seek asylum in Mexico
METHOD	Border Visit Guatemala-Mexico. Not a data set.
DEMOGRAPHIC	Guatemalans Not specified.
ANNOTATION	While WOLA reports harsh treatment of border crossers, and assesses that push factors remain strong, they see “little evidence of cocaine” and “very slow growth of Mexican acceptance of refugees. ASSESS: This is a modest “deterrence” effect, as some unknown fraction will stay in Mexico. Applies only to Guatemala.
annotator	paul

ITEM	The Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) is at American University http://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/index.cfm
DATE	Founded in 2010, CLALS pursues projects in migration, the role of religion, organized crime, the environment, and more.
AUTHOR(S)	Eric Hershberg, Director; Dennis Stinchcomb, Assistant Director for Research; Robert Albro Assoc. Research Professor; Alexandra Vranas, Program Coordinator
FINDING	CLALS has numerous ongoing and archived projects
METHOD	CLALS studies use a variety of data sources, including government and non-government data and interviews with recent arrivals from Central America
DEMOGRAPHIC	While a number of recent studies and papers have focused on the Northern Triangle, CLALS also has worked on issues in Cuba, Brazile, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, and Peru.
ANNOTATION	Papers coming from CLALS workshops and projects are usually quite good, and some are relevant to the missed detections and deterrence

	issues.
annotator	dennisl

ITEM	Report: (2016) “Border Metrics: How to Effectively Measure Border Security and Immigration Control.” https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/border-metrics-how-effectively-measure-border-security-and-immigration-control
DATE	This is a conceptual piece that draws on many data sets prior to 2016
AUTHOR(S)	Marc R. Rosenblum and Faye Hipsman, Migration Policy Institute
FINDING	Considers four questions concerning the measurement of illegal immigration. The most relevant one for our purposes is, “How many unauthorized immigrants enter between ports of entry?”
METHOD	Conceptual analysis making use of many different kinds of data.
DEMOGRAPHIC	Considers both Mexican and Northern Triangle migrants.
ANNOTATION	<p>Among the relevant point made are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Approaches to measuring deterrence include: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Model-based recidivism analyses b. Using surveys (e.g. MMP, EMIF-Norte, etc.) c. Observational analyses (e.g. using estimates of “turn-backs” and “got-aways”) <p>The report suggests ways to improve on each of the methods and proposes that the best approach is to use all three methods.</p> 2. The report notes that there are several reasons to think that not all apprehended illegal migrants will try again (as was the case through the 1990’s for illegal Mexican immigrants virtually 100% of whom would repeatedly try to cross in the U.S.) and that the probability of apprehension is not the same for repeated attempts: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. More punitive consequences are used now b. Non-Mexican immigrants are a growing share of those apprehended, and are returned back to more distant locations c. People may develop different strategies for re-crossing that have different probabilities of apprehension d. There are different apprehension probabilities at different border locations, particularly as the BP changes strategies
annotator	dennis

ITEM	Report (2017) “Advances in U.S.-Mexico Border Enforcement: A Review
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	of the Consequence Delivery System https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/advances-us-mexico-border-enforcement-review-consequence-delivery-system
DATE	The U.S. Border Patrol implemented the Consequence Delivery System (CDS) in 2011. This report analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of the CDS for FY2011 through FY2014.
AUTHOR(S)	Randy Capps, Faye Hipsman, and Doris Meissner, Migration Policy Institute
FINDING	Found some evidence that CDS has worked to reduce recidivism, namely that the more severe forms of CDS (various forms of formal removal and court proceedings) led to lower recidivism rates compared to voluntary return.
METHOD	Used BP data from FY2011 through FY2014.
DEMOGRAPHIC	Considers all illegal migrants over 14 years old, which increasingly included more Central Americans as compared to Mexicans.
ANNOTATION	Varying forms of CDS appear to have an effect on deterrence, although for some analyses there are issues with the data, e.g. recidivism is defined as re-apprehension within the same Fiscal Year as the original apprehension. Some of the analyses may also be relevant to the Data Envelopment Analysis of how different sectors and stations allocate their resources.
annotator	dennis

ITEM	2017. "Violence, Development, and Migration Waves: Evidence from Central American Child Migrant Apprehensions." Clemens Paper. CGD: Working Paper 459 :
DATE	
AUTHOR(S)	Michael A. Clemens
FINDING	Econometrics models together with data on region or town of origin show that violence can be a significant explanatory factor in migration.
METHOD	
DEMOGRAPHIC	
ANNOTATION	CGD Working Paper 459. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. For detailed notes follow the link on my name. Relevance: This is an excellent example of how to do a careful economic analysis. It is based on data from the DHS, at the level of individual persons. It does not have all the kinds of information that we need. But it shows that BP can provide information at the level of the region of origin, quite fine-grained. This might enter into the demographic side of our analysis. The role of push factors, which he explores, provides some guidance as to the “quit” or “deterrence” as it is defined in our model.
annotator	paul This links to my detailed assessment,

ITEM	21ACK: A Post-Apprehension Survey of Unauthorized Immigrants along the U.S.-Mexico Border http://www.borders.arizona.edu/cms/sites/default/files/Post-Aprehension-Survey-REPORT%20may31-2013_0.pdf	
DATE	2013 Data collected in 2012 by interviews	
AUTHOR(S)	Mark Grimes Elyse Golob Alexandra Durcikova Jay Nunamaker BORDERS COE DHS S&T University of Arizona National Center for Border Security and Immigration	
FINDING		
METHOD	<table border="1" data-bbox="451 892 743 955"> <tr> <td>N=1,000 interviews.</td> </tr> </table>	N=1,000 interviews.
N=1,000 interviews.		
DEMOGRAPHIC		
annotator	paul	

ITEM	Measuring the metrics: Grading the government on immigration enforcement. Bipartisan Policy Center, Immigration Task Force.
DATE	2015
AUTHOR(S)	Bryan Roberts
FINDING	Chapter 4, Measures and Migration Decisions, is most relevant to the analysis of deterrence. It is suggested that there may be a “tipping point” in rising apprehension rates because higher rates lead to a much higher expected number of attempts before the border can be crossed successfully. Much below this tipping point, additional consequences if caught are not likely to be effective unless they are quite severe, because of the great likelihood of success on the next attempt. Much above the tipping point, additional consequences may not be necessary.
METHOD	Based on surveys such as MMP.
DEMOGRAPHIC	Largely Mexican migrants. Calls for additional studies based on Central American migrants.
ANNOTATION	Cites the Borger et al (2012) finding that the Great recession, improvements in the Mexican economy, and border enforcement intensification each accounted for roughly one-third of the downturn in illegal immigration of Mexican nationals to the united states since 2003.

Annotator	dennis
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ITEM	Managing illegal immigration to the United States: How effective is enforcement? Council on Foreign Relations, Special Study.
DATE	2013
AUTHOR(S)	B. Roberts, E. Alden, J. Whitely
FINDING	Analyzes at-the-border deterrence (deterring an immigrant from another attempted illegal border crossing, (recidivism) and behind-the-border deterrence (causing a potential immigrant to not to attempt illegal migration in the first place). It appears that improved enforcement (actual apprehension rates approaching 50% or higher) has raised the level of both types of deterrence for potential Mexican migrants.
METHOD	Based on MPP and MMFRP surveys and GAO analyses
DEMOGRAPHIC	Mexican migrants
ANNOTATION	
Annotator	dennis